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Abstract
Background: This scoping review investigates the relationship between governance, pharmacovigilance, and Agencia
Nacional de Vigilancia Sanitaria (ANVISA) in Brazil, which has authority over Brazil's national pharmaceutical policy, drug
registration and coordination of the national pharmacovigilance system. The purpose is to investigate opportunities for
effective pharmacovigilance.
Methods: Sixty-three terms pertaining to pharmacovigilance in Brazil and ANVISA, global institutions, pharmaceutical
industry, and civil society were searched in thirteen relevant databases on November 17-18, 2013. Using a
pharmacogovernance framework we analyzed ANVISA's pharmacogovernance: the manner in which governing
structures, policy instruments, and institutional authority are managed to promote societal interests for patient
safety due to medication use. The integration of transnational policy ideas for regulatory governance into
pharmacogovernance in Brazil was also investigated.
Results: Brazil's policy, laws, and regulations support ANVISA's authority to ensure access to safe medicines and health
products however ANVISA's broad mandate and gaps in pharmacogovernance account for regional disparities in
monitoring and assessing drug safety. Gaps in pharmacogovernance include: equity and inclusiveness; stakeholder
coordination; effectiveness and efficiency; responsiveness; and intelligence and information.
Conclusions: Pharmacogovernance that addresses 1) regional resource disparities, 2) federal and state lack of
coordination of pharmacovigilance regulations, 3) asymmetric representation in the pharmaceutical regulatory
agenda and which 4) disaggregates regulatory authority over health and commercial sectors would strengthen
pharmacovigilance in Brazil.
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Introduction
Pursuant to Article 196 of the Brazilian Constitution,
all Brazilians have the right to health [1–3]. The Con-
stitutional commitment to health for its population
includes access to safe, effective, quality essential medi-
cines; guidelines to promote rational use; and cost control
[3] as expressed in Brazil’s National Medicines Policy
(NMP). One key challenge the Federal government has
faced is how to determine what governance, regulations
and policy instruments best fulfill Brazilian’s constitutional
right to health; including assuring nationwide equity in
monitoring, assessing, and communicating drug safety
risk. Accordingly, we investigate pharmacogovernance in
Brazil and the Agência Nacional de Vigilância Sanitária
(ANVISA) regulatory governance for their impact on
pharmacovigilance (the science and activities relating to
detecting, assessing, understanding and preventing ad-
verse effects or other possible drug-related problems).
We define pharmacogovernance as the manner in
which governing structures; policy instruments and insti-
tutional authority (ability to act, implement and enforce
norms, policies and processes) are managed to promote
societal interests for patient safety and protection from
adverse drug events. Pharmacogovernance embraces a
culture that supports drug safety and contributes to
maintaining a healthy population, which the state and
corporate sector advances as aligned with pharmacovigi-
lance [4]. The absence of strong pharmacogovernance
undermines stewardship for postmarket drug safety,
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safety signal detection, risk communication and rational
medicine use. Weak pharmacogovernance therefore
entails a lack of oversight and accountability that
may negatively affect pharmacovigilance by:
 Creating opportunities for corruption to emerge [5–7];
 Creating institutional conflicts of interest, whereby
regulators are dually responsible for protecting
patient safety and industry competitiveness [8–10];
 De-incentivizing adoption of legislation and norms
for pharmacovigilance; and
 De-incentivizing detection of adverse drug reactions
(ADR) [5–7].
These negative outcomes of deficient pharmacogover-
nance are at odds with public health needs and the
constitutional right to health in Brazil.
We also investigated whether governance by the Agên-
cia Nacional de Vigilância Sanitária (ANVISA) and sup-
port from the international community are sufficient to
ensure postmarket drug safety across Brazil. Specifically,
we investigated how global actors’ policy ideas for regu-
latory governance (e.g., transparency and accountability)
were integrated into pharmacogovernance in Brazil.
Global actors were broadly defined as agents that in-
fluence public policy in multiple countries. They in-
cluded employees of the World Health Organization/
Pan American Health Organization (WHO/PAHO),
US Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Global Fund,
European Medicines Agency (EMA) and others that have
provided pharmacovigilance guidelines, best practices,
training, regulatory norms, technical expertise and access
to global knowledge networks [11–16].
We employ Ideation Theory to frame our understanding
of how and why global actors’ policy ideas and norms
pertaining to pharmacovigilance have gained traction in
Brazil. Ideation Theory suggests that a meaningful feature
of global actors is their capacity to convert ‘soft power’ into
‘hard power’ whereby global actors’ policy ideas and know-
ledge influence the policy agendas, policy tools, legislation,
and practices of recipient countries [17]. Soft power repre-
sents a persuasive approach that is taken to shape or co-
opt government policy preferences or public opinion. The
power to influence rests in perceived legitimacy or shared
values [18]. Norms are presented as a ‘toolbox’ from which
countries choose according to perceived relevance.
Ideation Theory suggests that policy uptake usually re-
quires collaboration between national and transnational
policy actors’ with technical and financial support [19].
New ideas (e.g., such as the use of policy tools for ana-
lyses of regulatory policy) are adopted to the extent that
they respond to concrete policy problems, resonate with
the interest and ideas of key actors and are brought to
the attention of relevant public agencies that have the
structural capacity to implement the new ideas [20]. The
policy ideas are reinforced through peer learning. Peer
learning is used as a strategy for the diffusion of global
development agencies’ policy ideas to poor and develop-
ing countries [17, 21].
Our paper is organized as follows. First, the evolution of
pharmacovigilance and regulatory authority over postmar-
ket drug safety in Brazil is described. Next, our search
methodology is described following the STARLITE report-
ing criteria. Following, our research findings are reported
for each of the literature typologies we identified. Lastly,
recommendations to advance pharmacogovernance and
pharmacovigilance in Brazil are provided.
Background
The 1990’s was marked by a groundswell of discourse sup-
porting pharmacovigilance by domestic and global actors.
Support for pharmacovigilance grew in Brazil’s univer-
sities, consumer advocacy groups, drug information cen-
ters, and health professional associations during the 1990s
[22]. State pharmacovigilance centers and drug informa-
tion centers (Centros de Informação de Medicamentos)
were established in São Paulo, Ceará, Paraná and Mato
Grosso do Sul during the period between 1989 and 1998
[16, 22–25]. Pharmacovigilance was also the focus of the
IV Brazilian Congress on the Surveillance of Drugs (1997),
Conference of Brazilian Society of Hospital Pharmacy I
and II, and the 1st Brazilian Seminar on Pharmacoepide-
miology [16]. Global actors’ policy ideas during this
period, as later described in this paper, served as a catalyst
for discussions regarding nationwide pharmacovigilance
systems. The disseminated policy ideas influenced state
pharmacovigilance initiatives in Brazil [14] (Fig. 1).
The Agência Nacional de Vigilância Sanitária (ANVISA)
was established in 1999. ANVISA ’s mandate is to protect
and promote population health and ensure access to safe
medicines, health products and services [3, 26]. It is one of
Brazil’s largest regulatory agencies; overseeing the imple-
mentation of aspects of Brazil’s NMP [27, 28]. ANVISA reg-
ulates products, sectors and services related to health and
numerous areas not directly relevant to pharmaceuticals or
medical devices (e.g., foods, tobacco, agricultural chemicals,
airports, and border surveillance) although much of its re-
sources are allocated to non-health sectors [26, 29]. It regu-
lates products and services that are valued at approximately
25 percent of Brazil’s gross domestic product [29].
ANVISA’s governance reflects the reform agenda
championed by President Fernando Henrique Cardoso
beginning in 1995 and continuing throughout his presi-
dency. Cardoso’s endorsement of regulatory oversight
led to a surge in the creation of newly structured regula-
tory authorities [30, 31]. ANVISA’s governance also
reflected global actors’ ideas for regulatory governance
that were circulated during the 1990s [29, 30].
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The post 2000 period
Brazil’s National Pharmacovigilance System (NPS) was
adopted in 2001. The NPS is managed by the Pharma-
covigilance Unit [27] and coordinated by ANVISA
[27, 28]. The National Center for Monitoring of Medi-
cines (CNMM) was also created in 2001 following the
meglumine tragedy (2000) that resulted in hundreds of
fatal ADRs [14, 27, 32]. The emergence of yet another
incident of serious and fatal ADRs resulting from the use
of medicines (e.g. thalidomide in1960) reinforced to the
Federal government the need for governing structures and
institutional authority over drug safety in Brazil. Today,
the CNMM is headquartered in the Pharmacovigilance
Unit and is responsible for planning, coordinating and
supervising the formulation and implementation of oper-
ational guidelines and technical norms for medicines
safety, rational use and surveillance.
Like many areas of the health system governance, re-
sponsibilities are shared at different levels. Both ANVISA
and Brazilian state governments have responsibility for
pharmacovigilance. State Centros de Vigilância Sanitária
(CVS) are responsible for implementing policy and
practices to reduce ADRs and poor quality medicines.
Pharmacosurveillance, monitoring drug adverse-effects
for signals of safety issues, is carried out by regional
pharmacovigilance centers in 193 sentinel hospitals and
sentinel pharmacies as part of the Notifying Pharmacies
project [33, 34]. The Notifying Pharmacy project (Farmá-
cias Notificadoras), a partnership between the CVS and
State Boards of Pharmacy, requires a pharmacist be present
during pharmacy operating hours and submit reports of
drug-related problems to the CNMM [35].
Methods
A scoping review of peer reviewed and grey literature
from pharmacy, health, political science, and the social
sciences, pertaining to global actors (e.g. WHO, Global
Fund) and pharmacovigilance, regulatory governance,
accountability and transparency in Brazil was conducted
for this study of governance and pharmacovigilance in
Brazil. The scoping review was used to map the existing
literature and gather a holistic picture of pharmacogo-
vernance in Brazil. Cochrane Collaboration guidelines
for qualitative research were followed for searching,
inclusion, and data extraction [36, 37]. The full search
strategy is presented in Table 1 and follows the STAR-
LITE reporting criteria [36]. The acronym STARLITE
represents sampling strategy, type of study, approaches,
range of years, limits, inclusion and exclusions, terms
used, and electronic sources. Although we narrowly
defined the research question, pre-determined inclusion
and exclusion criteria, and followed a strategy for data
extraction- consistent with a systematic review, we did
not apply quality filters and nor formally assess the
quality of the literature included in our study- consistent
with a scoping review [38].
Search methods
Search methods included entering search terms into rele-
vant databases, organizational websites (e.g., ANVISA)
and hand searching. Sixty-three search terms were entered
into 13 relevant databases on November 17-18, 2013 to
identify literature pertaining to pharmacovigilance, gov-
ernance, transparency, specific global actors, the pharma-
ceutical industry, ANVISA, and civil society (Additional
file 1). Acronyms and full text were entered as search
terms, such as World Health Organization and WHO. All
databases were searched for the same time period which
was the beginning date of the database (e.g., OVID [1946]
and International Pharmaceutical Abstracts [1970]) through
November 18th, 2013. Data were only available through
October 2013 for some of the databases searched. This date
range was selected to capture literature describing global
actors’ influence in Brazil in the years prior to the creation
of ANVISA up to the date of the search. The databases
Fig. 1 Factors influencing pharmacovigilance in Brazil
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searched were Ovid MEDLINE(R) 1946 to November
Week 1 2013, Ovid OLDMEDLINE(R) 1946 to 1965, Ovid
MEDLINE(R) In-Process & Other Non-Indexed Citations
November 15, 2013, Ovid Healthstar 1966 to October
2013, Embase Classic + Embase 1947 to 2013 Week 46,
International Pharmaceutical Abstracts 1970 to October
2013, International Political Science Abstract 1989 to Octo-
ber 2013, Journals@Ovid Full Text November 18, 2013,
Embase 1974 to 2013 November 15, LILACS DATE 1st
mentioned to November 18, 2013, PubMed 1st mention to
November 18, 2013, EBSCO search Oct 16, 2013 and
SciELO 1st mention to Nov 17, 2013. There were no
search restrictions. English, Portuguese, and Spanish
publications were included.
The 1137 records retrieved were derived from: OVID/
Embase (986), LILACS (57), PubMed (89) and EBSCO
(5). After duplicates were removed 358 records remained.
Data from ANVISA, WHO and PAHO websites (4) was
included.
Criteria for selecting studies
Two researchers (KM, PC) read through the titles and
abstracts (all written in English) to determine relevance
to this study. Phase I exclusion criteria comprised publi-
cations that described: 1) vaccines, herbals or animal
studies; 2) pre-market studies (phase I, II, and III); 3)
pharmaceutics methods; 4) randomized controlled trials
or observational studies pertaining to therapeutics or
characterizing drug-specific ADRs and 5) studies that
were retrieved solely because the author was from Brazil,
or a Brazilian reference was cited (Fig. 2). In phase II,
the full text was read to determine inclusion (Table 2).
Full texts written in Portuguese and Spanish were
read; then translated into English using Google translate;
then re-read before determining inclusion. Publications
not meeting inclusion criteria provided background
information to contextualize Brazil’s experience with
pharmacovigilance.
Types of studies included
Fourteen publications met our inclusion criteria
(Table 2). The publications that were included char-
acterized: 1) global interventions in Brazil pertaining
to governance or pharmacovigilance, 2) ANVISA
regulatory governance (e.g., accountability and trans-
parency), and 3) pharmacogovernance in Brazil. All
of the publications that met the inclusion criteria
were read iteratively by the principal author and data
was extracted that was relevant to 1) how global ac-
tors, their policy ideas and instruments influenced
Brazil’s regulatory governance and pharmacovigilance
and 2) how ANVISA’s pharmacogovernance supports
pharmacovigilance.
Data extraction and management
A selective approach to data extraction was employed in
this research [37]. Data specifically related to the study
question(s) and the pharmacogovernance domains were
extracted. A pharmacogovernance framework was used to
analyze the relationship between pharmacogovernance
and pharmacovigilance. The pharmacogovernance do-
mains were established a priori. Our pharmacogovernance
domains were: Policy, Law, and Regulation; Transparency
and Accountability; Participation and Representation;
Equity and Inclusiveness; Effectiveness and Efficiency;
Intelligence and Information; Ethics; Responsiveness;
and Stakeholder coordination (Fig. 3). Quality of the lit-
erature included in this review was neither prioritized nor
formally assessed.
Results
Our scoping review identified fourteen publications on
the topic of governance and ANVISA in Brazil; nine
specifically addressed accountability and/or transpar-
ency. From this sample, four referenced global institu-
tions. Nearly half of the publications (4) were written by
persons internal to ANVISA and described regulation
Table 1 Scoping Review structured According to STARLITE Principles
STARLITE principles
S Selective sampling strategy: Articles selected from pharmacy, health, political science, and the social sciences databases
T All types of studies were included (policy papers, qualitative studies, dissertations)
A Approaches: Subject searching, citation searching, hand-searching, internet searching
R Range (No restrictions): to the beginning of each database—to November 18, 2013
L No Limits
I Inclusion: Global actors and pharmacovigilance, regulatory governance, accountability and transparency in Brazil; Exclusion: Studies describing
1) vaccines, herbals or animal studies; 2) pre-market studies (phase I, II, and III); 3) pharmaceutics methods; 4) randomized controlled trials
or observational studies pertaining to therapeutics or characterizing drug-specific ADRs or 5) did not describe pharmacovigilance in Brazil
T Terms (See Table 1)
E Electronic sources: Ovid MEDLINE(R), Ovid OLDMEDLINE(R), Ovid MEDLINE(R) In-Process & Other Non-Indexed Citations, Ovid Healthstar,
Embase Classic + Embase, International Pharmaceutical Abstracts, International Political Science Abstract, Journals@Ovid Full Text, Embase,
LILACS, PubMed, EBSCO, SciELO, GOOGLE Scholar
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Fig. 2 Scoping review flowchart. †Reasons for excluding articles included: descriptive studies of vaccines, herbals/phytopharmaceuticals, nutraceuticals,
OTCs, pharmacovigilance interventions, characterization of drug specific ADRs, methods and tools for assessing causality
Table 2 Characteristics of literature screened for inclusion or exclusion
Published literature on pharmacovigilance and regulatory governance [n = 128]
Type Topic Subject n
A ADR studies: A1: Specific drug(s) [43] 65
Prevalence and Characterization of ADRs A2: Vaccines, herbals, phytopharmaceuticals, nutraceuticals, Over-the
Counter [22]
B Theoretical papers (Not Brazil specific) B1: ADR reporting [3] 14
B2: Risk communication [1]
B3: Regulatory harmonization [1]
B4: Global actors’ norms or Global governance [6]
B:5 Pharmacovigilance regulatory authority Latin America [3]
C Pharmacovigilance practices in Brazil C1: Industry implementation of pharmacovigilance [2] 35
C2: Analysis of pharmacovigilance centres, sentinel hospitals & notifying
pharmacy ADR reports [9]
C3: Pharmacovigilance Systems, regulations, or policies [20]
C4: ADR prevention interventions [4]
D Regulatory governance, pharmacogovernance
and pharmacovigilance
D1: Transparency and/or Accountability [5] 14
D2: Global actors and Transparency and/or Accountability [3]
D3: Regulation, Policy and Law [6]
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and regulatory reforms in ANVISA. The publications
that were analyzed were classified into 4 typologies. The
typologies that were found were classified into the fol-
lowing areas: 1) ANVISA’s regulatory reforms and policy
instruments; 2) ANVISA’s regulatory governance; 3) glo-
bal actors’ influence on norms in Brazil pertaining to
governance or pharmacovigilance; and 4) ANVISA and
the pharmacogovernance domain(s) (Table 3).
Literature describing ANVISA’s regulatory reforms and
policy instruments
ANVISA was one of the earliest regulatory authorities to
take up reforms aimed to strengthen regulatory manage-
ment processes [21]. The ANVISA Regulatory Process
Improvement Programme or Good Regulatory Practices
Program (PRO-REG) required mandatory implementa-
tion of a Regulatory Agenda [10].
ANVISA’s priority areas are adopted into an agenda
that is established through participatory governance
whereby the public is invited to participate in a consult-
ation process [10]. The general population and industry
may participate in the public consultation. The Regulatory
Impact Analysis (RIA) is another policy instrument to
improve and strengthen the regulatory system [10, 39].
The RIA is described as a tool for accountability and
transparency because it evaluates policy effectiveness, effi-
ciency and responsiveness in meeting ANVISA’s regula-
tory agenda [10, 21]. According to Ramalho (2009 p8),
PRO-REG and RIA are tools for ANVISA to create an ‘in-
stitutional environment favourable to social and economic
development of the country.
Literature describing ANVISA’s regulatory governance
ANVISA was established as an independent regulatory
body with administrative and fiscal autonomy, under
contract with the Ministry of Health (MoH) [26, 29].
It also receives funding annually from pharmaceutical
company registration and drug registration fees.
ANVISA is governed by a 5-member Collegiate Board
of Directors that is accountable for the agency’s activities
[26]. Its Advisory Board includes representation from
industry, the scientific community, government and the
public.
Brazil’s Federal Constitution gave legitimacy to public
stakeholder engagement in decision-making spaces. Par-
ticipatory governance was endorsed as a ‘strategy for
strengthening governance and the legitimacy of regula-
tory action in the country’ ([10], p1) yet, consumer inter-
ests are represented by only two of ANVISA’s 12-member
board (Instituto Brasileiro de Defesa do Consumidor and
Fundação Procon/São Paulo) [8]. ANVISA’s Ombudsmen,
appointed by the Minister of Health and approved by
president of Brazil, was established to respond to citizen
issues; providing another mechanism to the public inter-
ests to be voiced.
Fig. 3 Pharmacogovernance framework
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Table 3 Typology of included literature





ANVISA (2009) ANVISA Stratégias
prioritárias da gestão institucional.
www.anvisa.gov.br/divulga/noticias/
2009/pdf/cartilha_pmg.pdf
Agency report ANVISA’s strategies and priorities for
institutional management
• ANVISA 2008 strategic plan (summary)
• Aims of regulatory management reform
• The Regulatory Agenda as a policy instrument to strengthening
regulatory governance through increased transparency and
social participation
• ANVISA’s ongoing experience with the regulatory reform
ANVISA (2009) Gaetani, F., &
Albuquerque, K. Capítulo 8:





and analysis of regulatory
impact (Chapter 8)
Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) as
a policy instrument to improve
regulatory management
• Globalization and regulatory reform in Brazil
• Rationale for adoption of global actors’ policy ideas
• Policy, law and regulations adopted for regulatory improvement
• Characterization of RIA as a policy instrument to improve the
regulatory decision-making
• ANVISA’s Regulatory Agenda as a policy tool for transparency




ANVISA (2009) Commissioned report:
Regulation and Agency
Regulators: Governance
and analysis of regulatory
impact (Chapter 5)
Factors influencing the development
of regulatory authorities in Brazil
• Characterization of the political and economic conditions
influencing regulatory reforms
• Description of enabling legislation for regulatory reform of 10
agencies- including ANVISA
ANVISA (2009) de Mello, D. R.,
& Ramalho. Capítulo 11: Boas
práticas regulatórias: previsibilidade
e transparência na Agência








ANVISA’s best practices for regulatory
management to improve accountability
and transparency.
• Global actors’ influence on ANVISA’s regulatory governance
• ANVISA’s characteristics and scope




and norms in Brazil
pertaining to governance
or pharmacovigilance
ANVISA (2009) Cruz, V. Capítulo 2:





and analysis of regulatory
impact (Chapter 2)
Factors influencing the development
of regulatory authorities in Brazil
• Global actors’ influence on regulatory reform and ANVISA’s
governance structure
• Rationale for adoption of global actors’ policy ideas
Dainesi, S. (2005). Journal Article Implementation of pharmacovigilance
in Brazil • Characterization of pharmacovigilance pertaining to efficiency and
transparency
• Recommendations for supporting a culture of disclosure to advance
pharmacovigilance
PAHO. (2011) Commissioned report: Description of PAHO best practices





Biehl, J., et al. (2009). Princeton
University, Princeton
Commentary Description of the growing trend of
litigation to gain access to medicines
in the context of incomplete
knowledge of the safety of medicines.
• Need for transparency in drug approval process and placement
of drugs on SUS formulary.
Cruz, V. (2010) Journal Article ANVISA is used as a case study of
institutionalized mechanisms for
accountability and transparency
• Civil society participation as a mechanism to increase regulatory
accountability and transparency
• Global actors’ influence on ANVISA’s regulatory governance















Table 3 Typology of included literature (Continued)
Freitas, M. & Romano-Lieber,
N. (2007)
Journal Article Laws pertaining to pharmacovigilance
and industry
• Laws requiring ADR reporting by industry
• Laws requiring industry pharmacovigilance departments
• Evaluation of the effectiveness of laws
Gava, C., et al. (2010) Journal Article Medicines registration process for new
and generic drugs
• Characterization of Brazil’s drug registration process
• Description of processes lacking transparency
Miranda, A. (2010). Dissertation ANVISA’s experience with transparency
in regulatory management
• Characterization of the conditions leading to drug safety reforms
• Characterization of ANVISA’s scope and mandate
• Social participation and transparency in regulatory management
• Characterization of the effectiveness of ANVISA’s actions to include
social participation in decision making
Mastroianni PC, Lucchetta RC.
(2011)
Journal article ANVISA and the drug approval process • ANVISA’s role in protecting medicines safety
• Drug registration and re-registration requirements
Pereira, M. F. (2010) Thesis Social participation and community
health councils
• Characterization of social participation as a mechanism of
governance in Brazil
Prat, A. G. (2013) Journal Article Laws pertaining to drug approval • ANVISA requirements for drug registration in Brazil
Silva, G. H. (2011). IV Congresso
CONSAD de Gestao Publica.
Conference paper ANVISA’s experience using the
Regulatory Impact Analysis
• Global actors’ influence on ANVISA’s regulatory reforms with
emphasis on transparency and accountability
• Characterization of ANVISA’s Regulatory Process Improvement
Programme including the Regulatory Agenda
• Analysis of the implementation of the Regulatory Agenda
• Characterization of effectiveness and remaining gaps
Vashisth, S., Singh, G., & Nanda,
A. (2012)
Journal Article Comparative study of pharmacovigilance
in Brazil, Russia, India and China
• Requirements for drug approval
• Characterization of effectiveness and gaps in pharmacovigilance















Literature describing global actors’ influence on norms in
Brazil pertaining to governance or pharmacovigilance
Brazil’s pharmacogovernance, especially the adoption of
regulatory agencies, drug safety policy and pharmacovigi-
lance norms, has been shaped by national and transnational
actors (Additional file 2) [2, 8, 14, 21, 29, 30, 40, 41]. They
endorsed the establishment of National Regulatory Au-
thorities (NRAs) e.g., ANVISA. Global actors, such as
the Pan American Network for Drug Regulatory
Harmonization (PANDRH) Working Group on Phar-
macovigilance, endorsed ‘…qualification of the NRAs in
the Region in accordance with criteria established by
PAHO/WHO in order to establish reference Regulatory
Authorities…’ , in Brazil and throughout Latin America
to achieve access to quality, safe, and efficacious medi-
cines ([42], p1). Brazil was recognized by PAHO as one
of 5 regional reference authorities [43].
Domestically, Carlos Luis Bresser-Pereira, Brazil’s Minister
of Federal Administration and Reform of the State
(1995-1998) championed regulatory reform to address
‘bureaucratic administration [that] is slow, [and has]
little or nothing geared to meet the demands of citi-
zens’ [31, 44]. Silva (2011) and Ramalho (2009 p127)
posited that regulatory reform in Brazil was also motivated
by the desire to harmonize regulatory practices with global
norms ‘especially as regards [to] conformation of bureau-
cracy and its interaction with the "outside world"’ and to
increase Brazil’s acceptance into ‘the circle of countries
with a modern regulatory system’([30], p56).
According to Silva (2011 p1) Brazil’s National Regulatory
Agenda and ANVISA reforms have ‘mirrored most devel-
oped countries’. ANVISA’s Good Regulatory Practices Pro-
gram (PRO-REG) is modeled after FDA, Health Canada,
Australia Therapeutic Goods Administration, UK Medi-
cines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency, and
Portugal’s Instituto Nacional da Farmácia e do Medica-
mento [10]. The PRO-REG has incorporated OECD norms
for regulatory impact analysis and WHO principles for
Good Governance in Medicines (GGM) [45]. Although
Brazil is not an active participant in the GGM programme,
ANVISA has adopted many WHO/PAHO norms pertain-
ing to pharmacovigilance. Specific norms include: good
governance for supply chain management, code of ethics
to prevent corruption, good manufacturing processes
spontaneous ADR reporting and sentinel reporting
sites [11, 15, 46, 47].
Literature describing ANVISA and Pharmacogovernance
We analyzed ANVISA’s pharmacogovernance in nine
core domains: Policy, Law and Regulation; Transparency
and Accountability; Responsiveness; Participation and
Representation; Equity and Inclusiveness; Effectiveness
and Efficiency; Intelligence and Information; Ethics; and
Stakeholder coordination.
Policy, Law and Regulation
Brazil has well defined ‘policy, law, and regulation’ to
enable pharmacovigilance. Pharmacovigilance is inte-
grated into Brazil’s national health care system. Existing
laws grant the agency authority to regulate drug registra-
tion, ADR reporting, approve patent applications and
drug pricing. Pharmaceutical companies desiring product
registration in Brazil must submit proof of safety and effi-
cacy [3]; an EMA Certificate of Medicinal Product or Cer-
tificate of Pharmaceutical Product issued by FDA or
country of origin; and may undergo manufacturing site in-
spection to assure ANVISA’s Good Manufacturing Prac-
tices are observed. Product registration must be renewed
every five years [3]. The renewal process requires submis-
sion of ADR reports, complaints, technical reports of
therapeutic ineffectiveness, pharmacovigilance data, and
product long-term stability studies [3]. Generic drug regis-
tration requires submission of tests for pharmaceutical
equivalence and bioavailability to their reference drug [3].
Drug manufacturers are required to establish a corporate
pharmacovigilance program. Freitas and Romano-Leiber
(2007) found that despite resolution RDC No. 4, Article 3
(2009) fewer than half the companies responding to their
survey (20) had implemented a program. Thirteen com-
panies that implemented a pharmacovigilance program
were multinational corporations and 7 were domestic com-
panies [48]. Market authorization holders are required by
Federal law (n° 6,360/76 article 79) to report ADRs associ-
ated with their drugs to the competent health authority
[33, 49], however Freitas and Romano-Lieber (2007) found
that few domestic companies provided regular training for
reporting ADRs. Compliance with international regulatory
requirements and international harmonization was the
rationale given for reporting by 25 % of the pharmaceutical
companies surveyed [48].
Despite policies, laws, and regulations intended to sup-
port ANVISA’s mandate to ensure access to safe medi-
cines, health products and services (Additional file 2), our
study found literature describing a lack of standardization
and regulation of medicines prior to the adoption of
Brazil’s NMP [50] that still persists today.
Transparency and accountability
‘Transparency’ in the public pharmaceutical sector is de-
fined as openness in sharing information. It is a ‘principle
whereby those affected by administrative decisions should be
informed, and it is the duty of civil servants, managers and
trustees to act visibly, predictably and understandably’ ([6],
p162). Information is publicly and easily accessible when
regulatory decision making is transparent. Transparency
aids in building understanding and trust from healthcare
professionals in regulatory decisions and risk minimization
measures [51]. We define accountability as taking responsi-
bility for postmarket drug safety policy outcomes.
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Accountability and transparency were described as
agency values on ANVISA’s website [26]. Norms for trans-
parency were codified by Ministerial Decree n°5.482/05.
ANVISA’s regulatory agenda and management contract
were described as instruments of accountability (Cruz
2010 and Silva 2011). Both aimed to address past issues
that included a ‘lack of systematization and standards for
the regulatory process;… lack of predictability of regulatory
actions; …and inadequate mechanisms for transparency…
and participation’ ([10], p3). ANVISA’s 3-year manage-
ment contract was described as a mechanism of adminis-
trative review of the agency’s performance [41]. The
requirement for ANVISA to submit reports to its advisory
board, the MoH, National Health Council and competent
authorities to account for its activities was described
as another mechanism of accountability. The integra-
tion of public participation in consultations and hear-
ings to debate ANVISA’s regulatory agenda was also
described in the literature as a mechanism for trans-
parency and accountability [8, 52].
The literature describing transparency, accountability
in ANVISA’s administrative procedures has been con-
tested. We identified literature that emphasized how trans-
parency was needed in the drug approval process, drug
surveillance and regulatory control of medicines [2, 9].
ANVISA’s lack of transparency was noted in the 13th
National Conference on Health report [8]. Gava et al.
(2010) argued transparency was lacking in ANVISA’s
approval of ‘me-too’ drugs that have little benefit over
drugs currently marketed. A ‘me-too’ drug is a new mo-
lecular entity or biological equivalent, structurally similar
to an existing drug (e.g., anti-cholesterol drugs atorvastatin
and pravastatin). Gava et al. (2010) have recom-
mended a more transparent registration process
whereby data is publicly available to inform con-
sumers, health professionals and health managers,
about the true benefits and risks of drug treatment.
A behavioural impediment to a culture of transparency
and disclosure was also described in the literature.
Dainesi (2005) found that health care professionals’
reluctance to report errors, adverse events and treat-
ment failures was an impediment to pharmacovigilance.
ANVISA, industry and academia must each promote
‘values that should guide corporate governance’: a culture
of transparency, justice, overall compliance with regula-
tions, and accountability ([53], p186).
Participation and representation
The pharmacogovernance domain ‘participation and rep-
resentation’ pertains to public representation and involve-
ment in decision making at regulatory authority and
government public meetings to establish the regulatory
agenda and rules for postmarket drug safety. ANVISA’s
Regulatory Agenda is determined annually through what
is reported to be a participatory process. The Brazilian
constitution and laws support social participation to get
public input in regulatory decision making.
We found literature that suggested that the general
public was under represented in public decision making
spaces (e.g., public forums). Public representation in
Municipal Councils was described as largely comprised
of citizens with higher education and income [8]; with
lesser representation of minority and marginalized groups
[54]. Miranda (2010) found a gap in public knowledge of
spaces for citizen participation. Whereas ANVISA de-
scribed the Ombudsman's Office and the telephone ex-
change as spaces for public input some key informants
did not know how to use the services (e.g. where to
submit a report). Additionally, Miranda (2010) found that
key informants incorrectly identified the National System
of Controlled Products Management (SNGPC) and Sis-
tema de Notificações para a Vigilância Sanitária (NOTI-
VISA) as spaces for public participation. NOTIVISA is
Brazil’s online system for reporting ADRs. Consumers
may not submit reports to this online system. Only indus-
try, health professionals, hospitals and pharmacies are per-
mitted to submit reports to NOTIVISA.
Equity and inclusiveness
We define ‘inclusiveness’ as spaces for public participation
in pharmacovigilance policy setting that are accessible to
all segments of the population. ANVISA working papers
describe agency actions to increase spaces for social par-
ticipation in ANVISA’s decision making [8, 10, 39, 41, 52].
Citizen consultation in public hearings is required by or-
dinance prior to the adoption of new regulatory standards
or rules changes [8, 52]. The literature suggests that
although public policy and regulation in Brazil aims to en-
courage inclusive decision making, equity and inclusive-
ness has not yet been realized [8, 54].
Miranda (2010) and Pereira (2010) found gaps in the
public’s capacity to participate in ANVISA’s decision
making spaces that impede inclusive governance. Al-
though advance notice of public meetings is posted to
ANVISA’s website disparities exist in internet access. Up
to 65 % of the population in some Brazilian states has
limited to no internet access [8, 55]. Online notification
fails to reach audiences without computer access. Meet-
ings scheduled at times and locations that are not readily
accessible to the public limits inclusion. The literature
suggests that inclusion in ANVISA’s public consultation
for its Regulatory Agenda is asymmetric with greater
participation by industry and wealthy individuals. ‘Infor-
mation asymmetry between the government regulated
sector and society’ compromises transparency and equity
([8], p78-9).
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We define ‘equity’ as economic and social resource
allocation to ensure that all regions within the country
have access to safe medicines and resources to detect
and act on drug safety signals. Pharmacovigilance cover-
age in all regions is a measure of equity. The literature
suggests that resources to monitor and assess drug safety
are not distributed equitably nationwide. Although
sentinel hospitals are located throughout the country,
the number of sentinel sites is greatest in the most
highly resourced and densely populated southeast re-
gion (includes São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Minas
Gerais) and the least in rural, less populated north
and central-west regions with poverty levels up to 42
percent [55]. While ANVISA’s Notifying Pharmacies
project has the potential to expand pharmacosurveil-
lance, participation has been low [33, 56].
Effectiveness and efficiency
Pharmacovigilance policy, law and regulations are defined
as effective when they benefit patient safety. Actions to
improve pharmacovigilance are efficient when they are
undertaken in a timely manner. We found gaps in the
literature pertaining ANVISA’s analysis of the effectiveness
of pharmacovigilance policies and their capacity to moni-
tor compliance with policy, law and regulation pertaining
to postmarket drug safety.
Ramalho (2009) suggested that ANVISA’s effectiveness
has been challenged by: 1) fragmented establishment of
norms; 2) a culture of disregard for rules of the State; 3)
unnecessary or overlapping regulations; 4) ineffective
monitoring and enforcement; and 5) poor design and/or
implementation of norms leading to high costs for com-
pliance. ANVISA’s diverse portfolio was described as too
expansive to “effectively monitor a pharmaceutical mar-
ket with the size and growing demand of Brazil” ([33],
p141). Vashisth et al., (2012) argued that stronger en-
forcement mechanisms were needed to strengthen phar-
macovigilance, particularly in regards to generic drugs
registered before 2003 (prior to proof of bioequivalence
requirements), although the extent of the problem of
substandard generics was not reported.
Intelligence and information
The pharmacogovernance domain ‘intelligence and infor-
mation’ pertains to mechanisms that exist to improve
communication among the national regulatory authority,
state pharmacovigilance centers, healthcare professionals,
policymakers, patients and the general public with respect
to medicine safety. Risk communication about drugs with
real and potential safety issues is important for enabling
the safe use of medicines [51].
Our analysis of the literature describing ANVISA’s
pharmacogovernance in the domain intelligence and
information is limited. We found only three abstracts
that described risk communication in Brazil. Two ab-
stracts described ADR reporting mechanisms- ANVISA’s
website, sentinel hospitals, and the CNMM [57, 58]. The
third described the importance of training health profes-
sionals to report ADRs [59]. None of the abstracts
described the process by which ANVISA communicates
information about safety signals to the states or munici-
palities. Given the inequities in the sentinel reporting
site distribution, it is anticipated that corresponding
inequities exist in risk communication.
Incompatibility between databases in Brazil was de-
scribed as an impediment to data sharing of ADRs
reported for medicines and immunizations [personal
communication 2014]. Brazil does not submit case safety
reports to the Uppsala Monitoring Centre using the UMC
global reporting format. Moreover, Brazil’s domestic ADR
reporting form collects less information than 13 countries
studied [60].
Ethics
‘Ethics’ is defined as respect for justice, autonomy, non-
maleficence, and beneficence to safeguard patient inter-
ests, right to safe medicines and health. Miranda (2010)
argues that ANVISA has a dual mandate: to increase the
competitiveness of domestic industries under its purview
and protect population health. The dual mandate under-
mines beneficence and patients’ rights to safe medicines
and health. The literature challenges the assumption that
ANVISA can balance incompatible societal interests in
patient safety and industry interests [8, 10]. Gava et al.
(2010 p3410), suggest that while ‘…health authorities
should act as mediators between the interests of drug
manufacturers and the needs of public health… [they
have a] duty to protect health’. Access to safe medicines
may be compromised by ANVISA’s policy to evaluate
the potential impact of regulatory action with regard to
national competitiveness [10]. Miranda (2010) and Silva
(2011) concur that ANVISA must reconcile its dual
mandate to ‘better withstand the volatile nature of
conflicts of interest in relations of production and con-
sumption, seeking to strengthen its regulatory role…’
([10], p20).
Responsiveness
The pharmacogovernance domain ‘responsiveness’ is de-
fined as promptly acting to address drug safety issues
and enact pharmacovigilance policies/regulations. We
found a gap in the literature pertaining to ANVISA’s re-
sponsiveness in addressing drug safety issues. Although
we are aware that the agency has posted drug safety
alerts on its website, we were unable to find literature of
Regulatory Impact Analyses conducted of ANVISA’s risk
communication policies for responding to drug safety
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issues. The literature regarding RIA was primarily de-
scriptive; assessing whether ANVISA acted on an agenda
item [10] rather than the impact of specific policies or
regulation.
The first agenda items directly relevant to pharmacov-
igilance were added to the 2013-2014 agenda, five years
after the Regulatory Agenda policy was implemented
[61]. They pertain to requirements for companies to
communicate registration changes, product labeling risk
communication, and rational use of medicines.
Stakeholder coordination
The pharmacogovernance domain ‘stakeholder coordin-
ation’ describes actions by ANVISA and global actors to
coordinate activities aimed to strengthen pharmacovigi-
lance. The literature was searched for evidence of stake-
holders’ efforts to coordinate initiatives and/or resources
to strengthen postmarket drug safety. We found a gap in
the literature regarding stakeholder coordination for the
purpose of enabling pharmacovigilance. We identified
literature describing global and domestic actors’ inter-
ventions, policy preferences and norms in Brazil, but not
examples of stakeholder coordination pertaining to any
specific pharmacovigilance intervention.
Discussion
The present study contributes to the literature on phar-
macogovernance and the relationship between govern-
ance, pharmacovigilance and global institutions in Brazil.
The few articles published are written in Portuguese
limiting the transfer of knowledge about Brazil’s experi-
ence with pharmacogovernance. This is the first English
language review of which we are aware.
Understanding the relationship between ANVISA’s
governance and pharmacovigilance is important. Phar-
macogovernance embraces a culture of postmarket drug
safety. It assures that governing structures, policy instru-
ments, authority to implement and enforce norms,
policies and processes preserve societal interests for
patient safety and protection from adverse drug events.
Regulatory governance and pharmacogovernance that
best supports pharmacovigilance is still being debated glo-
bally [41, 62–65]. Questions regarding governing struc-
tures, authority to implement and enforce norms, policies
and processes to mitigate ADRs, the regulator-industry
relationship, scope of regulatory authority, reliance on
industry-produced studies, mechanisms for independent
review and accountability for decision-making remain.
Our study found that the literature written by those
internal to ANVISA was mostly favourable to the agency’s
efforts to advance a culture of transparency and account-
ability. One study, written by an author external to
ANVISA, suggested that greater transparency was needed
regarding drug registration, reauthorization and ADR
reporting to benefit patients served by Brazil’s National
Health System (Sistema Único de Saúde [SUS]).
Transparency confers legitimacy, increases account-
ability in decision-making and is a basic requirement of
good governance [8, 41]. The absence of transparency
obfuscates the ability to identify whose interests are
served by policy preferences adopted.
We found Brazil’s pharmacogovernance was strongest
in the domain of policy and law. Existing regulations
should effectively enable access to safe medicines [43].
Gaps in other domains however disenabled postmarket
drug safety and have led to regional disparities in pharma-
covigilance between highly resourced states and under
resourced Brazilian states.
Our findings regarding the pharmacogovernance do-
main ‘intelligence and information’ suggest that signal
generation and risk communication may be impeded in
Brazil. ‘Ethics’ is challenged by ANVISA’s excessively
broad purview over disparate sectors (e.g. pharmaceuti-
cals to airports) and dual industry-health mandate that
threaten strong pharmacovigilance policies. Industrial
interests and public health interests are not typically
aligned. Conflicts arising from industry accountability to
shareholders have been shown to create tensions that
impede pharmacovigilance [4, 66, 67]. With ANVISA’s
dual mandate, the balance between medicines safety, acces-
sibility, and economic development, is largely unachievable.
This could be mitigated by addressing concerns about
transparency in drug approval and re-approval decisions
raised in the literature.
ANVISA’s Regulatory Agenda and Regulatory Impact
Analysis could advance pharmacogovernance. To be
sure, since this study was conducted new norms and re-
visions of existing norms for medicines have been added
to the agenda. However, ANVISA has not undertaken
analysis of the impact of its pharmacovigilance system
nor analyzed the effectiveness of parallel reporting systems
between states and the federal government. Regulatory
impact analyses of ANVISA’s stakeholder participation
have not been conducted either. Greater public represen-
tation and participation would improve accountability and
could in principal hold regulators and drug compan-
ies to account for their decisions pertaining to phar-
macovigilance. Spaces for social participation must be
accessible to be effective and our research found that
strategies were needed to make public representation
more inclusive [8, 54].
Public participation in setting ANVISA’s Regulatory
Agenda could enable the adoption of policies that focus
on patients’ drug safety and advance pharmacovigilance.
The absence of norms for inclusive stakeholder participa-
tion in decisions regarding pharmacovigilance is troubling
and ANVISA’s expansive definition of ‘public’ opens
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public forums to industry as well as consumers; diluting
the voice of consumers. This asymmetry may disenable
decisions that improve equity in pharmacovigilance and
compromise transparency [8, 41].
ANVISA’s current governance and pharmacovigilance
norms reflect global and domestic actors’ policy ideas.
This has benefitted pharmacogovernance with respect to
norms for pharmacovigilance systems, infrastructure, drug
surveillance and regulatory accountability. Global actors’
influence on pharmaceutical policy has not always aimed
to advance drug safety and access to medicines; there-
fore, Brazil has exercised autonomy in determining
which norms to adopt. An example is Brazil’s decision
to retain its 5-year product renewal requirement, un-
like the EMA, which reversed its drug reauthorization
policy to adopt the US model of continuous reauthorization
[3, 68]. Reauthorization permits periodic reassessment of
drug registration that informs decisions to require post
authorization studies, market withdrawal, or condi-
tional re-approval. It shifts the onus to drug companies
to show cause for why drug registration should be
reauthorized rather than regulatory justification for
why registration changes may be needed.
Policy uptake is strongly conditioned by country specific
contexts including national traditions including the pat-
tern of government-industry relations [21, 63]. Brazil’s
prior confrontation with the World Trade Organization
over the TRIPS Agreement, may explain its reluctance to
adopt all global actors’ policy ideas. More accountability
for decision-making is desirable to assure public interests
are protected from influence by unelected regulatory au-
thorities (e.g. World Trade Organization, International
Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements
for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use).
Conclusion
Our findings suggest that pharmacogovernance that ad-
dresses 1) regional disparities in the use of policy instru-
ments and distribution of resources for monitoring and
assessing drug safety nationwide, 2) federal and state inco-
ordination of pharmacovigilance regulations, 3) asymmet-
ric representation in public consultation for ANVISA’s
regulatory agenda and which 4) disaggregates ANVISA’s
health and commercial sector regulatory oversight is
needed. Disaggregating ANVISA’s regulatory oversight of
health and commercial sectors would mitigate conflicts of
interests and disincentives to adoption, implementation
and enforcement of strong pharmacovigilance policies.
Further research is needed to better understand the re-
lationship between pharmacogovernance and postmarket
drug safety in decentralized, federal systems especially
pertaining to accountability and equity. Scope for further
research includes studies to answer: 1) How do decen-
tralized state bodies, responsible for the implementation
of pharmacovigilance policies, interact with the cen-
tral regulatory authority policymakers?, 2) Who is ac-
countable for pharmacovigilance where decentralized
governance exists? and 3) How is accountability to
consumers, industry, the Ministry of Health and
global stakeholders balanced?
The literature on pharmacogovernance establishes that,
in Brazil, investments in pharmacogovernance processes
have generated significant improvements in patient health
through a number of mechanisms, including transparency,
accountability, policy, law and regulation. The literature
also points to a number of mechanisms by which pharma-
cogovernance may improve health that have not developed
as fully in Brazil compared with other nations. Three such
mechanisms include, first, comprehensive ethics processes
for review of clinical trials for new drugs, proposals for post
authorization safety studies and the distribution of drugs;
second, the use of new data and analytics to reveal the
prevalence of disease and to administer medical resources
where they are urgently needed; and third, to improve the
engagement of diverse stakeholders in decision-making
about resource allocation for pharmacovigilance.
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